Policy Uncertainty and Firm Cash Holdings by Phan, Hieu V. et al.
University of Texas Rio Grande Valley 
ScholarWorks @ UTRGV 
Economics and Finance Faculty Publications 
and Presentations 
Robert C. Vackar College of Business & 
Entrepreneurship 
2-2019 
Policy Uncertainty and Firm Cash Holdings 
Hieu V. Phan 
Nam H. Nguyen 
The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley 
Hien T. Nguyen 
Shantaram Hegde 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.utrgv.edu/ef_fac 
 Part of the Finance Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Phan, Hieu V., Nam H. Nguyen, Hien T. Nguyen, and Shantaram Hegde. “Policy Uncertainty and Firm Cash 
Holdings.” Journal of Business Research 95 (February 1, 2019): 71–82. https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.jbusres.2018.10.001. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Robert C. Vackar College of Business & 
Entrepreneurship at ScholarWorks @ UTRGV. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics and Finance Faculty 
Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ UTRGV. For more information, 










Policy Uncertainty and Firm Cash Holdings 
 
Hieu V. Phan, Nam H. Nguyen, Hien T. Nguyen, and Shantaram Hegde† 
  
                                                            
† Hieu V. Phan (corresponding author), hieu_phan@uml.edu, Manning School of Business, University of 
Massachusetts Lowell, 72 University Avenue, Lowell, MA 01854, phone: (978) 934-2633; Nam H. Nguyen, 
nam.nguyen1@utrgv.edu, Robert C. Vackar College of Business & Entrepreneurship, University of Texas Rio 
Grande Valley, 1201 W University Dr, Edinburg, TX 78539, phone: (956) 278-9881; Hien T. Nguyen, 
nthuhien@hcmut.edu.vn, School of Industrial Management, Ho Chi Minh University of Technology, Vietnam 
National University – Ho Chi Minh City, 268 Ly Thuong Kiet Street, District 10, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, phone: 
(84) 838-660-898; Shantaram Hegde, shegde@business.uconn.edu, School of Business, University of Connecticut, 
2100 Hillside Road, Storrs, CT 06269, phone: (860) 486-5135. 




Policy Uncertainty and Firm Cash Holdings 
Abstract 
This research examines the relation between government economic policy uncertainty and firm 
cash holdings. We find evidence that policy uncertainty is positively related to firm cash holdings 
due to firms’ precautionary motives and, to a lesser extent, investment delays. The relation between 
policy uncertainty and cash holdings is more pronounced for firms dependent on government 
spending and extends beyond business cyclicality. Further analysis indicates that the effects of 
policy uncertainty on corporate cash holdings are distinct from those of political, market, or other 
macroeconomic uncertainty.  
JEL Classifications: G18, G32, G38 









Government economic policy uncertainty can have detrimental effects on the economy. 
Previous research suggests that uncertainty related to government spending, tax, and regulatory 
and monetary policies exacerbated the 2007–2009 Great Recession and slowed the economic 
recovery (Stock and Watson, 2012; Baker, Bloom, and Davis, 2016). The level of policy 
uncertainty in the United States increased significantly during the period 1985–2012, peaking 
around the government’s failure in raising federal debt-ceiling in August 2011 and the fiscal cliff 
crisis at the end of 2012 whereby several previously enacted laws would come into effect 
simultaneously, potentially leading to an increase in taxes and a decrease in spending.1 Economic 
policy uncertainty was suggested to have caused more than one-percentage-point decrease in the 
U.S. real gross domestic product (GDP) and the loss of over one million jobs during the period 
2011-2012 (source: Wall Street Journal, April 28, 2013).2 Given the profound impact of policy 
uncertainty on the economy, academic researchers have shown increasing interest in investigating 
the effects of policy uncertainty on corporate policies. 
Recent studies document that government economic policy uncertainty has negative 
financial and real effects. Gulen and Ion (2016) and Nguyen and Phan (2017) report that firms are 
more likely to delay investments, particularly those that are irreversible, amid high economic 
policy uncertainty. Policy uncertainty can increase the cost of external financing, which 
                                                            
1 The fiscal cliff was related to the expiration of the Bush tax cuts of 2001 and the planned spending cuts under the 
Budget Control Act of 2011. 
2 Available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323789704578443431277889520, last accessed on 
May 22, 2016. 




exacerbates firms’ financial constraints (Pástor and Veronesi, 2013; Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajsek, 
2014).  
Cash is an important and liquid corporate asset. The increasing trend in cash holdings of 
U.S. firms has attracted attention from investors and academic researchers. Bates, Kahle, and Stulz 
(2009) report that the average cash-to-assets ratio of U.S. industrial firms more than doubled 
during the period 1980–2006, increasing from 10.5% to 23%. Previous studies offer several 
explanations for corporate cash holdings, including transaction costs (Mulligan, 1997), 
precautionary motives (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 1999; Han and Qiu, 2007; Bates 
et al., 2009; Khieu and Pyles, 2012), corporate governance (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; 
Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2008; Kuan, Li, and Chu, 2011), business organization structure 
(Locorotondo, Dewaelheyns, and Hulle, 2014), tax incentives (Foley, Hartzell, Titman, and Twite, 
2007; Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 2013), product market competition (Fresard, 2010), and 
idiosyncratic risk (Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu, 2001). However, little is known about the 
link between government economic policy uncertainty and corporate liquidity. Our research fills 
this gap in the literature by examining the effect of policy uncertainty on corporate cash holdings. 
Policy uncertainty can affect corporate cash holdings in a number of ways. Since policy 
uncertainty decreases asset returns and increases the cost of external financing, which exacerbate 
firms’ financial constraints (Gilchrist et al., 2014; Pástor and Veronesi, 2013; and Brogaard and 
Detzel, 2015), firms are motivated to increase cash reserves to buffer against financial shocks and 
maintain smooth operation. From the real option perspective, firms may choose to delay 
investment amid high uncertainty (Bernanke, 1983; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Gulen and Ion, 
2016), which also leads to an increase in cash holdings. Since policy uncertainty tends to be 




temporary, increased cash holdings can provide flexibility that allows firms to exploit future 
profitable investment opportunities when uncertainty recedes. Policy uncertainty can also increase 
managerial conservatism (Panousi and Papanikolaou, 2012), inducing firms to hold more cash, 
which is the most liquid asset. For these reasons, we expect a positive relation between policy 
uncertainty and cash holdings.  
We begin by examining the effect of government economic policy uncertainty on corporate 
cash holdings. Similar to recent studies related to policy uncertainty (Panousi and Papanikolaou, 
2012; Pástor and Veronesi, 2013; Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajsek, 2014; Gulen and Ion, 2016; 
Nguyen and Phan, 2017), we use the economic policy uncertainty index developed by Baker et al. 
(2016; hereinafter labeled BBD index) as the measure of government economic policy uncertainty. 
Using a sample that includes 119,322 firm-year observations of 13,981 unique firms over the 
period 1986–2015, we find that policy uncertainty is positively related to corporate cash holdings. 
Further analysis indicates that precautionary motives and, to a lesser extent, investment delays 
explain the positive relation between policy uncertainty and the level of cash. Our findings are not 
susceptible to possible alternative explanations such as managerial agency problems or external 
financing.  
Since the BBD index and corporate cash holdings follow an increasing trend over the 
sample period, one may be concerned about a possible spurious relation between the two. 
Alternatively, policy uncertainty tends to be countercyclical whereas firms may hold more cash in 
the down state of the economy, which raises a possibility that our observed positive relation 
between policy uncertainty and corporate cash reserves is simply driven by business cyclicality. 
We perform two analyses to address these concerns. In the first analysis, we examine the relation 
between policy uncertainty and corporate cash holdings conditional on firms’ dependence on 




government spending. We find that the positive relation between policy uncertainty and cash 
holdings is more pronounced for firms dependent on government spending, implying that 
government economic policy uncertainty affects corporate cash holdings rather than the two being 
spuriously related. In the second analysis, we sort firms into subgroups depending on whether they 
belong to pro-cyclical or countercyclical industries. Our results indicate that the positive relation 
between corporate cash holdings and policy uncertainty is significant for both subgroups of firms, 
suggesting that the relation extends beyond business cyclicality.  
We run several additional tests to ensure the robustness of our findings. First, policy 
uncertainty and corporate cash holdings can be jointly correlated with unobservable variables, such 
as investment opportunities, which raises endogeneity concern. We use the IV regression model 
to address this endogeneity concern and find that our results are robust to endogeneity correction. 
Second, the BBD index may capture the effects of general economic uncertainty that potentially 
confound our finding, therefore, we control for several proxies for economic uncertainty including 
the annual standard deviation of firm profit growth, the uncertainty of equity markets, economic 
uncertainty measured by GDP forecast dispersion, and aggregate macroeconomic uncertainty 
measures suggested by Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2015). Our finding is qualitatively unchanged. 
Third, the BBD index may pick up the effects of some other non-policy-related economic 
uncertainty, such as labor market variations, currency uncertainty or oil shocks, which tend to 
affect corporate cash reserves. Following Gulen and Ion (2016)’s suggestion that the U.S. and 
Canadian economies are closely linked and a shock that affects the economic uncertainty in the 
U.S. is likely to affect the economic uncertainty in Canada as well, we use the residuals of the 
regression of the BBD news-based index for the U.S. on the Canadian BBD news-based index and 
other macroeconomic variables as a proxy for policy uncertainty. We find that our results continue 




to hold. Fourth, some previous research reports that political uncertainty, which is typically 
associated with elections, can affect corporate policies. To alleviate a concern that policy 
uncertainty merely picks up the effects of political uncertainty, we control for political uncertainty 
in the cash holdings regressions but our results are qualitatively similar.  
Our research contributes to a burgeoning stream of literature that studies the effects of 
policy uncertainty on corporate behavior and firm value and to a more established stream of 
literature on the determinants of corporate liquidity. We show that policy uncertainty relates 
significantly to corporate cash holdings, which is one of the most important corporate financial 
policies. We uncover the drivers, i.e., precautionary motives and, to a lesser extent, investment 
delays, of the positive relation between policy uncertainty and corporate cash holdings. Our 
findings provide timely implications for corporate managers, investors, and policy makers given 
the recent sharp increase in policy uncertainty and the acute interest in promoting business growth 
and job creation.  
Our research is related to some recent studies on the relation between uncertainty and firm 
cash holdings. Gao, Grinstein, and Wang (2017) find a positive effect of systematic uncertainty, 
which is obtained from the regression of implied volatility of firms’ traded stock options on the 
implied volatility of the S&P 500 index (VIX), on firm cash holdings through firms’ future cash 
needs and costs of external financing channels. However, our research focuses particularly on the 
effects of government economic policy uncertainty, which is different from their systematic 
uncertainty in measurement, time frame, and implications (Baker et al., 2016; Nguyen and Phan, 
2017). Another research related to ours is Demir and Ersan (2017), which examines the relation 
between policy uncertainty and corporate cash holdings in emerging (BRIC) economies over the 
period 2006-2015. Our research examines the relation between policy uncertainty and cash 




holdings of firms in a single country, the U.S., which is not susceptible to unobserved time-varying 
country social, economic, and political conditions that may correlate with policy uncertainty. 
Moreover, our sample period (from 1986-2015) spans several business cycles, thus, our results are 
unlikely to be confounded by the consequences of the recent Great Recession.  
2. Empirical Prediction 
Policy uncertainty may increase firms’ future cash flow volatility, thereby increasing the 
deadweight costs of financial distress. Previous research reports that policy uncertainty reduces 
asset returns and increases the cost of external financing, which exacerbate firms’ financial 
constraints (Pástor and Veronesi, 2013; Gilchrist et al., 2014; Brogaard and Detzel, 2015). Facing 
possible external financing uncertainty and higher costs of capital amid high policy uncertainty, 
firms are more likely to increase their cash reserves to buffer against financial shocks and maintain 
smooth operation and investment. Moreover, firms are likely to delay investments amid high 
policy uncertainty (Gulen and Ion, 2016; Nguyen and Phan, 2017), which may also lead to larger 
cash holdings. Obviously, firms can distribute cash that is not used for investment to investors but 
they might consider the trade-off between reducing unprofitable cash holdings and costly external 
financing due to market frictions if they have to raise external funds to support investments in the 
future when policy uncertainty recedes. Since policy uncertainty is unlikely to be permanent, 
holding cash could be more cost effective than paying out first and raising external funds later.3 
Policy uncertainty also heightens managerial conservatism (Panousi and Papanikolaou, 2012). 
Among different classes of assets, cash is the most liquid that could be the asset of choice for 
                                                            
3 We examine the effect of policy uncertainty on corporate payouts in the robustness check section and find that firms 
actually decrease payout during the periods of high policy uncertainty. 




conservative managers during the periods of high policy uncertainty. Given the foregoing 
discussions, we predict a positive relation between policy uncertainty and firm cash holdings.  
 
3. Samples, Variables Construction, and Descriptive Statistics 
We obtain U.S. public firms’ accounting data from Compustat and stock price and return 
data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) databases. Since the first year that 
the BBD index is available is 1985, our sample period begins in 1986 and ends in 2015. Following 
the literature, we exclude firms from the utility and financial industries from our sample because 
these firms are highly regulated and their cash holdings may have a different meaning.  
We use the BBD policy uncertainty index constructed by Baker et al. (2016) as the measure 
of government economic policy uncertainty. The BBD index is constructed based on the monthly 
value-weighted average of three components that include the frequency of newspaper articles 
containing key terms related to policy matters and economic uncertainty, the dispersion in 
economic forecasts of government spending and consumer price index (CPI) as a proxy for 
uncertainty about future fiscal and monetary policy, and uncertainty about future changes in the 
federal tax codes measured by the dollar impact of tax provisions set to expire in the near future. 
The weights for the news-based, forecaster disagreement and expiration tax code components are 
1/2, 1/3, and 1/6, respectively. In our analysis, we construct the policy uncertainty measure as the 
natural logarithm of the average of monthly BBD index values in a given year.  
The first component of the BBD index, the news-based uncertainty, captures the intensity 
of concerns about policy uncertainty. This component is constructed based on the news articles 
from 10 large newspapers including the Boston Globe, the Chicago Tribune, the Dallas Morning 
News, the Los Angeles Times, the Miami Herald, the New York Times, the San Francisco 




Chronicle, USA Today, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Post. Specifically, an article 
will be counted if it contains terms in all three categories related to uncertainty, the economy, and 
policy including: ‘uncertainty’ or ‘uncertain’, one of the terms ‘economic’ or ‘economy’, and one 
of the terms ‘congress’, ‘deficit’, ‘federal reserve’, ‘legislation’, ‘regulation’, or ‘white house’. 
Baker et al. (2016) find that the news-based uncertainty increases with intense news coverage of 
events such as the Gulf Wars, terrorist attack (9/11), the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, the 2011 
debt-ceiling dispute, and stock market crash (Black Monday).  
The second component, the dispersion in economic forecasts of government spending and 
consumer price index (CPI), is measured as the average of the interquartile ranges of Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) and federal, state and local governments spending forecasts. The fiscal and 
monetary policies data are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia's Survey of 
Professional Forecasters. The third component, the level of uncertainty related to future changes 
to the tax code, is measured by the discounted value of the revenue effects of all tax provisions set 
to expire over the next ten years. The federal tax code provision expiration data are acquired from 
the Congressional Budget Office. 
 We report the descriptive statistics of the sample in Table 1. The sample consists of 119,322 
firm-year observations of 13,981 unique firms. Cash-to-assets is the ratio of cash to the book value 
of assets (i.e., Compustat items CH/AT). Cash-to-net assets is the ratio of cash to net assets, where 
net assets are defined as the book value of assets minus cash. Policy uncertainty is the natural 
logarithm of the average monthly BBD index in a given year. Market-to-book is defined as the 
market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. Leverage is the ratio of the book value 
of debt to the book value of assets. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. We winsorize the 
continuous variables at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the effects of outliers. The sample 




average cash-to-assets ratio (cash-to-net assets ratio) is 14.04% (30.20%). The average value of 
BBD index is 104.76, which is similar to those reported by Baker et al. (2016) and Gulen and Ion 
(2016).  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
4. Empirical Models, Results, and Discussions 
4.1. Baseline Regressions 
Our cash holdings model is similar to the one adopted by previous research (e.g., Opler et 















	 	 , ,                    (1) 
In equation (1), the dependent variable is either the cash-to-assets or cash-to-net assets ratio. The 
test variable is policy uncertainty, PU, which is proxied by the BBD index. We use policy 
uncertainty lagged by one period to alleviate endogeneity concern. Consistent with our prediction, 
we expect the coefficient  to be positive and statistically significant. We control for several 
factors that are documented in the literature as having power to explain corporate cash holdings, 
including firm size, growth opportunities, cash flows, net working capital, capital expenditures, 




financial leverage, industry cash flow volatility, R&D investments, and acquisition activities.4 It 
is worth noting that since the cash level model explicitly controls for the level of firm investment 
in the forms of capital expenditures, R&D, and acquisitions, the model captures both the direct 
effect of policy uncertainty on the level of cash, due to precautionary purposes, through the stand-
alone policy uncertainty variable and its indirect effect on cash holdings due to investment delays 
through the investment variables. The model further includes firm fixed effects to control for 
unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics or industry fixed effects to control for industry-wide 
common factors. We do not control for year fixed effects because BBD index is the same for all 
firms in a given year (Gulen and Ion, 2016; Nguyen and Phan, 2017). Finally, we use the 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firms for statistical inference. 
Table 2 reports the results of the corporate cash holdings regressions. Because the results 
are qualitatively similar when the dependent variable is either the cash-to-assets or cash-to-net 
assets ratio, we report the cash-to-assets regression results for discussion (but the results for cash-
to-net assets regressions are available from the authors). Consistent with our expectation, the 
estimated coefficients of policy uncertainty are positive, ranging from 0.011 to 0.016, and 
statistically significant at the 1% level.5 The economic effect of policy uncertainty on corporate 
                                                            
4 Similar to the previous research (e.g., Opler et al., 1999; Foley et al., 2007; Harford et al., 2008, Bates et al., 2009, 
Phan et al., 2017), we control for contemporaneous firm characteristics in the cash level model. However, our findings 
hold if we use the lagged firm characteristics as controls.  
5 In an unreported analysis, we examine the effect of policy uncertainty on corporate excess cash. Specifically, we run 
a cash level regression model that includes all control variables but without policy uncertainty and obtain the predicted 
level of cash. Excess cash is calculated as the difference between the actual and predicted level of cash. Then we 




cash holdings is also important. Our calculation indicates that, holding other variables fixed at their 
sample means, a one standard deviation increase in policy uncertainty above its sample mean is 
associated with a 0.39 to 0.64 percentage-point increase in corporate cash holdings, which is 
equivalent to 2.7% to 4.6% of the sample mean. Turning to the control variables, the coefficients 
of capex and acquisitions are all negative and statistically significant, indicating a negative relation 
between investment and the level of cash. To the extent that policy uncertainty negatively affects 
investment (Gulen and Ion, 2016), the negative relation between corporate investment and cash 
holdings implies an indirect and positive effect of policy uncertainty on the level of cash through 
the investment channel. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
To put the economic effects of policy uncertainty on cash holdings due to the precautionary 
motives and investment delays in perspective, based on the estimates reported in Column 1 of 
Table 2, we find that one standard deviation increase in policy uncertainty is associated with an 
increase of 0.42% (42 basis points) in cash after controlling for the investment effects. On the other 
hand, one standard deviation increase in capital expenditures (R&D) is associated with a decrease 
(increase) of 0.02% (0.0055%) in cash. These comparisons of the magnitude of effects underscore 
our claim that the precautionary motives have a much larger economic impact on cash holdings as 
compared to the investment channel. 
4.2. Firm Dependence on Government Spending and Business Cyclicality 
                                                            
regress excess cash on policy uncertainty measure and find a positive relation between the two, which is consistent 
with our main finding. We thank a referee for suggesting this analysis. 




Since the BBD index and corporate cash holdings follow an increasing trend over the 
sample period, one may be concerned about a possible spurious relation between the two. To 
address this concern, we examine the relation between policy uncertainty and corporate cash 
holdings conditional on firms’ dependence on government spending. In particular, firms that are 
more dependent on government spending are more likely to be adversely affected by policy 
uncertainty, potentially leading to larger corporate cash holdings. Thus, policy uncertainty is 
expected to have a stronger effect on the level of cash of those firms that are more prone to the 
components of policy uncertainty, such as government spending. We follow Belo, Gala, and Li 
(2013) in measuring industry sensitivity to government spending by the ratio of each industry’s 
sales purchased by the government using the data from the Benchmark Input-Output Accounts 
provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). We construct the Sensitivity to government 
spending dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm’s industry sensitivity to government 
spending is above the sample median, and 0 otherwise. We rerun the corporate cash holdings 
model with Sensitivity to government spending dummy and its interaction with policy uncertainty 
and report the results in Columns 1-2 of Table 3. The coefficients of policy uncertainty remain 
positive and significant, whereas the coefficients of the interaction terms are also positive and 
significant, indicating that firms with sales sensitive to government spending hold larger cash 
reserves during the periods of high policy uncertainty.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
In an additional analysis, we use the data on government contracts, which are available 
from year 2000 onward, to estimate firm-level sensitivity to government spending.6 Due to the 
                                                            
6 Data on government contracts are publicly available at https://www.usaspending.gov/Pages/Default.aspx. 




large government contract dataset and the lack of common identifiers between the government 
contractors and Compustat firms, we use a fuzzy matching algorithm (provided by the SAS 
statistical software) and company names to match government contractors with Compustat firms. 
We then construct the Government contract dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm’s sales 
to the government in a given year is greater than $1 million, and 0 otherwise. We rerun the 
corporate cash holdings model augmented with this dummy variable and its interaction with policy 
uncertainty and report the results in Columns 3-4 of Table 3. The coefficients of policy uncertainty 
remain positive and significant, whereas the coefficient of the interaction term is positive and 
significant in Column 4 that controls for firm fixed effects. This result indicates that firms with 
larger sales to the government increases cash reserves when policy uncertainty increases. Taken 
together, the evidence indicates that government economic policy uncertainty affects corporate 
cash holdings rather than the two being spuriously related. 
Since policy uncertainty tends to be counter-cyclical while firms may hold larger cash 
reserves in the bad states of the economy, one may argue that the positive relation between policy 
uncertainty and cash reserves could simply be driven by business cyclicality. To alleviate this 
concern, we identify countercyclical and pro-cyclical industries based on the asset liquidation 
values proxied by firms’ sales cyclicality (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Sharpe, 1994; Almeida and 
Campello, 2007). If the relation between policy uncertainty and firm cash holdings is simply driven 
by business cyclicality, we expect the results to hold for only pro-cyclical industries. We estimate 
the coefficients of correlation between a firm’s sales and the annual gross national product (GNP) 
over the sample period, and calculate industry average of the correlation coefficients of the firms 
in the same 2-digit SIC industry. We sort industries into the pro-cyclical (countercyclical) 
subgroup if their average correlation coefficients are above (below) the sample median and then 




rerun the corporate cash holdings models by subgroups. The estimation results reported in Table 
4 indicate that policy uncertainty has a positive and significant effect on the level of cash of firms 
in both industry subgroups, implying that policy uncertainty’s effects on firm cash holdings extend 
beyond business cyclicality.7  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
4.3. Additional Analyses of the Drivers of the Relation between Policy Uncertainty and Cash 
Holdings 
The positive relation between policy uncertainty and cash holdings could arise from firm 
precautions and investment delays. To further establish the direct relation between policy 
uncertainty and corporate cash holdings due to precautionary purposes, we conduct a 
complementary analysis along firms’ investment irreversibility. The intuition is that firms with 
irreversible investments are more likely to delay investments amid high policy uncertainty (Gulen 
and Ion, 2016; Nguyen and Phan, 2017), implying that these firms’ larger cash holdings arise from 
investment delays. On the other hand, firms with low or no irreversible investments are less likely 
to delay investments during periods of high policy uncertainty, hence a positive relation between 
policy uncertainty and cash holdings of these firms indicates precautionary motives.  
We use two different proxies for investment irreversibility. The first proxy is capital 
intensity, which is calculated as the ratio of the net fixed assets to the book value of assets. A 
higher level of capital intensity indicates a higher level of investment irreversibility (Gulen and 
Ion, 2016). We construct the High irreversible investment dummy variable that takes a value of 1 
                                                            
7 Since we control for firm fixed effects in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4, we cannot perform the Wald test to compare 
the magnitude of the coefficients of policy uncertainty in these two columns. 




if a firm’s capital intensity measure is above the sample median in a given year, and 0 otherwise. 
We employ industry redeployability scores as the second proxy for irreversible investments using 
information from the 1997 capital flow table from the BEA (Kim and Kung, 2013). The table 
provides information about the capital expenditures of 123 industries, sorted into 180 asset 
categories. The redeployability score for each asset category is the ratio of the number of industries 
using that asset category. An industry’s redeployability score is the value-weighted average of the 
redeployability scores for each asset category in which the industry invests, whereas the weight 
for each asset category is its share in the industry’s total capital expenditures.8 By construction, a 
lower industry redeployability score means a higher level of investment irreversibility. We 
construct the Low redeployability dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm’s industry 
redeployability score is below the sample median, and 0 otherwise.  
We rerun the corporate cash holdings regressions that include proxies for investment 
irreversibility and their interactions with policy uncertainty and report the results in Table A.1 in 
the Internet Appendix. The results indicate that the coefficients of policy uncertainty are positive 
and statistically significant across specifications, suggesting a strong and robust direct effect of 
policy uncertainty on the corporate cash holdings of an average firm. On the other hand, the 
coefficient of the interaction between policy uncertainty and investment irreversibility proxy is 
positive and statistically significant in only Column 1, indicating a weak indirect effect of policy 
uncertainty on cash holdings through investment delays.  
                                                            
8 The Bureau of Economic Analysis uses the North American Industry System (NAICS) industries code so we merge 
the data with our sample using the two-digit NAICS code.  




 In the next analysis, we examine the effects of firms’ financial constraints on the link 
between policy uncertainty and corporate cash holdings. Since financially constrained firms 
typically do not have sufficient internal funds to finance investments and lack access to external 
capital, they are less likely to increase cash reserves amid uncertainty unless for precautionary 
purposes (Han and Qiu, 2007; Khieu and Pyles, 2012). We run corporate cash holdings regressions 
separately for subgroups of firms sorted on the following measures of financial constraints: S&P 
long-term credit ratings, firm size, market-to-book ratio, Whited-Wu index (Whited and Wu, 
2006), and size-age index (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010). The results reported in Table 5 indicate 
positive effects of policy uncertainty on the level of cash holdings for both subgroups, which 
implies that both precautionary motives and investment delays explain the positive relation 
between policy uncertainty and corporate cash holdings. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Managerial agency problems can affect the level of cash holdings (Harford et al., 2008), 
which may confound the relation between policy uncertainty and cash holdings if the regressions 
do not control for these problems. We rerun the cash level regressions while controlling for 
governance mechanisms that measure investor oversight by institutional investors (institutional 
ownership) and managerial entrenchment resulting from antitakeover provisions (GIM index or 
BCF index). The GIM index, developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), is the number of 
anti-takeover provisions adopted by a firm. The BCF index constructed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrell (2009) is the managerial entrenchment index measuring the adoption of six important anti-
takeover provisions including staggered boards, supermajority requirements for mergers, 
supermajority requirements for charter amendments, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, 




poison pills, and golden parachutes. By construction, a larger (smaller) institutional ownership 
implies better (worse) corporate governance. A larger (smaller) GIM index or BCF index value 
indicates worse (better) corporate governance. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2006) argue that these 
governance mechanisms can substantially affect the ability of investors to pressure managers to 
use cash efficiently. The estimated results reported in Table A.2 in the Internet Appendix indicate 
that the positive effect of policy uncertainty on corporate cash holdings is not sensitive to 
controlling for corporate governance measures. In an alternative specification, we rerun the test 
for subgroups of firms sorted on governance measures relative to their respective sample medians 
but the results are qualitatively similar.  
If firms raise external financing and hold the cash proceeds to buffer against policy 
uncertainty, which is a precautionary move, it will also explain the positive relation between policy 
uncertainty and the level of cash. We run the net debt and net equity issues regressions to gauge 
the effects of policy uncertainty on external financing and report the results in Panels A and B, 
respectively, of Table A.3 in the Internet Appendix. The dependent variable in Panel A is net debt 
issues which are calculated as the ratio of the change in total liabilities to total book value of assets 
(Hovakimian, Hovakimian and Tehranian, 2004; Lewis and Tan, 2016). The dependent variable 
in Panel B is net equity issues, which are estimated as the ratio of net cash from issuing and 
repurchasing equities to lagged assets. The results in both panels indicate that firms actually 
decrease external financing during high policy uncertainty periods. This evidence is also consistent 
with higher external financing costs amid policy uncertainty documented by Gilchrist et al. (2014). 
Intuitively, firms can pay out unused cash when policy uncertainty is high and access 
external financing markets later to raise funds when needed. However, policy uncertainty tends to 




be temporary and firms incur transactions costs when raising external financing, making paying 
out first and raising external financing later less appealing. We examine the effect of policy 
uncertainty on total payouts and report the results in Table A.4 in the Internet Appendix. We find 
that firms actually decrease payouts during the periods of high policy uncertainty, which lends 
further support to the precautionary motives of cash holdings.  
In summary, we investigate alternative explanations for the relation between policy 
uncertainty and firm cash holdings and find precautionary motives and, to a certain extent, 
investment delays as plausible explanations for the positive relation between the two.  
5. Robustness Checks and Additional Analyses 
5.1. Instrumental Variable (IV) Regressions 
Policy uncertainty and corporate cash holdings can be jointly correlated with unobservable 
variables, such as investment opportunities, which implies that our cash holdings regression model 
could be subject to the omitted variable bias, a source of endogeneity. We use the IV regression 
model to address this endogeneity concern. In particular, we use the partisan polarization measure 
suggested by McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (1997), Poole and Rosenthal (2000), and Gulen and 
Ion (2016) as an instrument for policy uncertainty. This measure tracks legislators’ ideological 
position over time. McCarty (2004) argues that partisan polarization hinders legislation building, 
leading to policy gridlock and greater variation in policy. Political polarization is a valid instrument 
in our analysis because it is directly related to policy uncertainty but there is no obvious reason to 
argue that it has a direct impact on the level and value of cash other than through policy uncertainty.  
We report the results of the level of cash IV regression in Table 6. Columns 1 and 2 do not 
control for firm fixed effects but Columns 3 and 4 do. The first-stage results of the IV regression 




model reported in Columns 1 and 3 of Table 6 indicate that the coefficients of the instrument are 
positive (0.496 and 0.690, respectively) and significant at the 1% level, confirming its relevance. 
The Wu-Hausman endogeneity test statistic validates our endogeneity concern. The Kleibergen-
Paap underidentification test statistic and the Cragg-Donald weak identification test statistic 
indicate that our selected instrument is relevant. The results of the outcome regression reported in 
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 6 indicate that the coefficients of instrumented PU are positive (0.458 
and 0.195, respectively) and highly significant, suggesting that our findings are robust to 
endogeneity correction.9  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
5.2. Control for Other Types of Uncertainty 
The BBD index may capture the effects of general economic uncertainty that potentially 
confound our finding of a positive relation between policy uncertainty and cash holdings. We 
address this concern by controlling for several proxies for economic uncertainty suggested by 
Bloom (2009) in our regressions. First, we calculate the annual cross-sectional standard deviation 
of firm profit growth as a proxy for future profitability variation, where firm profit growth is 
measured as the ratio of the change in net income to average sales. Second, we control for the 
uncertainty of the equity markets proxied by the standard deviation of monthly stock returns and 
the Chicago Board Options Exchange’s VXO index of implied volatility. Third, we use the GDP 
forecast data from the Philadelphia Federal Reserve’s Livingston survey to calculate the 
                                                            
9 We note that the coefficient estimates of policy uncertainty in Table 6 are significantly larger than those reported in 
Table 2, which could be because the IV models identify the local average treatment effect of the endogenous variable 
on the outcome variable (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). 




coefficient of variation of GDP forecast as a proxy for expected economic growth uncertainty. 
Finally, we control for an alternative measure of aggregate macroeconomic uncertainty suggested 
by Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2015). We augment the corporate cash holdings model with these 
five general economic uncertainty proxies but our finding is qualitatively unchanged (the results 
are not reported for brevity but they are available from the authors).  
To alleviate concern about possible collinearity between policy uncertainty and economic 
uncertainty when their proxies are included in the same regression, we further use a 2-step 
regression model to isolate the effects of economic policy uncertainty from those of economic 
uncertainty. Specifically, in the first step, we regress the BBD index on the five economic 
uncertainty variables mentioned above and obtain the residuals. We then rerun the cash holdings 
model using the residuals as a proxy for policy uncertainty. The results reported in Table A.5 in 
the Internet Appendix indicate that our finding persists. 
The BBD index may pick up some other non-policy-related economic uncertainty, such as 
labor market variations, currency uncertainty or oil shocks, which tend to affect the level of cash. 
This possibility implies a potential error-in-measurement problem that could bias the model 
estimation. It is noteworthy that the U.S. and Canadian economies are closely linked and a shock 
that affects the economic uncertainty in the U.S. is likely to affect the economic uncertainty in 
Canada as well. Thus, to address the possible error-in-measurement problem, we follow Gulen and 
Ion (2016) in estimating the BBD news-based index for the U.S. as a function of the Canadian 
BBD news-based index and other macroeconomic variables, and then we use the residuals (labeled 
RPU) from the regression as a proxy for policy uncertainty in the cash holdings model. By 
construction, the residuals are orthogonal to economic uncertainty common to both the U.S. and 




Canada and other macroeconomic factors included in the model. We re-estimate the level of cash 
model using RPU in place of the BBD index and report the results in Table A.6 in the Internet 
Appendix. The results suggest that our findings are robust to the error-in-measurement correction. 
Previous research documents that political uncertainty, which is positively related to 
national elections, affects corporate policies and asset prices. Bialkowski, Gottschalk, and 
Wisniewski (2008) and Boutchkova et al. (2011) report that firms operating in politically related 
industries experience higher stock return volatility during the presidential election periods. Kelly, 
Pástor, and Veronesi (2016) find that political uncertainty is priced in the equity stock market. 
Julio and Yook (2012) document a negative effect of presidential elections on investments. Xu et 
al. (2016) report a positive relation between political uncertainty and firm cash holdings for 
Chinese firms. To rule out a possibility that policy uncertainty merely picks up the effects of 
political uncertainty, we control for political uncertainty by augmenting the cash holdings model 
with an election indicator variable that takes a value of 1 for a presidential election year during the 
sample period, and 0 otherwise. The estimation results reported in Table 7 indicate that our results 
are robust to controlling for political uncertainty. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
5.3. Additional Analyses 
In a robustness check, we rerun the cash holdings regressions with the dependent variable 
being the ratio of cash and short-term investment to the book value of assets (i.e., Compustat items 
CHE/AT). The regression results reported in Table A.7 in the Internet Appendix indicate that our 
findings are robust to this alternative measure of corporate cash holdings.  




We argue earlier that policy uncertainty exacerbates firms’ financial constraints, leading to 
their increased precautionary cash holdings. In an unreported analysis, we examine the relations 
between policy uncertainty and debt maturity and debt costs. We find that policy uncertainty is 
negatively related to debt maturity and positively related to the costs of debt. Moreover, the 
stringent debt terms are concentrated among financially constrained firms (i.e., firms with low 
credit ratings or no ratings), which is consistent with the findings reported by Tran et al. (2018). 
This evidence lends support to a positive relation between policy uncertainty and financial 
constraints.  
The BBD index is constructed based on three components: The news-based uncertainty, 
the uncertainty of future expiration of the tax codes, and the disagreement in the monetary and 
fiscal policy. To gauge the effects of individual components on corporate cash holdings while 
alleviating concern about possible collinearity among the three components, we rerun the level of 
cash regressions with each component of policy uncertainty and report the results in Table A.8 in 
the Internet Appendix. The results indicate that the news-based and the tax-related uncertainty 
components have positive and significant effect on corporate cash holdings but the fiscal and 
monetary policy uncertainty does not have a significant effect on corporate cash holdings. This 
result is consistent with the findings of Gulen and Ion (2016) and Nguyen and Phan (2017) for 
corporate investments.  
As most of the accounting data are available on an annual basis, we use annual data in our 
analysis. However, to further check the robustness of our results, we reconstruct variables using 
quarterly data and perform analyses with these newly constructed variables. For variables whose 
quarterly data are unavailable, we use their annual data instead. Policy uncertainty is measured as 
the natural logarithm of the average monthly BBD index value of the preceding quarter. The results 




of the cash level model reported in Table A.9 in the Internet Appendix indicate that the coefficients 
of policy uncertainty are all positive (ranging from 0.081 to 0.120) and statistically significant at 
the 1% level, implying that the positive effect of policy uncertainty on corporate cash holdings is 
robust to quarterly data.  
Since our sample includes all firms from the Compustat universe (but excludes those in the 
financial and utility industries), there are many small firms that tend to be more susceptible to 
policy uncertainty. To alleviate a concern that our results could be biased by the inclusion of small 
firms in the sample, we filter out firms with the book value of assets below either $100 million, 
$500 million, or $1 billion, and rerun the level of cash regressions. We find that our results are 
insensitive to these filters.  
Fresard (2010) documents a positive relation between a firm’s cash holdings and its future 
market share gains at the expense of industry rivals, and the effect is stronger when rival firms face 
more financial constraints and belong to more competitive industries. To the extent that policy 
uncertainty exacerbates financial constraints, firms may be concerned about losing market share 
to cash-rich rivals, leading them to hold larger cash reserves to preempt competition.  
To examine the effect of policy uncertainty on the level of cash conditioned on industry 
rivalry, we use the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) as a proxy for industry rivalry. HHI is 
calculated as the sum of the squares of market shares of the firms within the same 3-digit SIC code 
industry in a given year, where market share is defined as a ratio of a firm’s sales to the sum of 
sales of the industry. Using whole percentages of market shares for calculation, HHI ranges from 
0 to 10,000; a lower (higher) HHI value indicates higher (lower) industry rivalry. Then we 
construct the competitive industry dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if an industry’s HHI 




value is below 1,500 in a given year, and 0 otherwise. We re-estimate the level of cash regressions 
augmented with competitive industry dummy and its interaction with policy uncertainty. Consistent 
with our predictions, the results reported in Table 8 indicate that the positive effect of policy 
uncertainty on the level of cash is more pronounced for firms in more competitive industries. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
In an additional analysis, we re-estimate our cash holdings regressions for high and low 
growth subsamples. Specifically, we sort firms into the high and low growth subgroups based on 
their market-to-book ratios, which proxy for growth opportunities. Firms are assigned to the high 
(low) growth opportunities subgroup if their market-to-book ratios are in the top (bottom) tercile 
of the sample. The results reported in Table 9 indicate that the coefficients of policy uncertainty 
are positive and significant at the 1% level for both subgroups, implying that policy uncertainty is 
associated with an increase in the corporate cash holdings for both high and low growth firms. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
Previous research documents that firms facing higher liquidity risk prefer cash over lines 
of credit (Acharya, Almeida and Campello, 2013; Acharya et al., 2014). To the extent that policy 
uncertainty increases firm liquidity risk, it may decrease firms’ lines of credit while increasing 
cash reserves. We examine the relation between policy uncertainty and firm’s lines of credit and 
report the results in Table 10. Following Acharya et al. (2014), we use data from the Capital IQ 
database to construct the credit line variable as the ratio of undrawn revolving credit to the sum of 
cash and undrawn revolving credit.10 The estimation results indicate a negative relation between 
                                                            
10 We acknowledge that the credit lines data from Capital IQ could be noisy.  




policy uncertainty and firms’ lines of credit in Columns 1-3. In a complementary analysis, we 
rerun the lines of credit regressions using the data of a random sample of 300 Compustat firms 
provided by Sufi (2009) that are also used by Acharya et al. (2014) in their analysis. The dependent 
variable is the Line Credit Dummy, which is an indicator that equals to 1 for firms with positive 
lines of credit, and 0 otherwise. The estimated results reported in Column 4 indicate that policy 
uncertainty is negatively related to firms’ lines of credit. This evidence further corroborates the 
argument that firms increase cash holdings for precautionary purposes.11 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
6. Conclusions 
We examine the relation between policy uncertainty and corporate cash holdings. Using 
the BBD index as a proxy for policy uncertainty, we find robust evidence that corporate cash 
holdings are positively related to policy uncertainty. Our analyses suggest that firms’ precautions 
and, to a lesser extent, investment delays induced by policy uncertainty lead to larger cash reserves. 
Our findings of a positive relation between policy uncertainty and cash holdings for firms with 
high growth opportunities highlight the detrimental effects of policy uncertainty on the type of 
firms that typically create more jobs, which is also consistent with earlier evidence that policy 
uncertainty delays real investments and impedes job creation.  
                                                            
11 We thank an anonymous referee for suggestion to consider lines of credit. 




Appendix A: Variables Definition 
Variable name  Construction  Data source  
Acquisition The ratio of corporate acquisition expenditures to 
the book value of assets 
Compustat 
Capex The ratio of capital expenditures to the book value 
of assets. 
Compustat 
Cash-to-assets The ratio of cash to the book value of assets Compustat 
Cash-to-net assets The ratio of cash to net assets, where net assets are 
defined as the book value of assets minus cash 
Compustat 
Cash flow the ratio of earnings after interest, dividends, and 





An indicator that takes a value of 1 for competitive 
industries with the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) below 1,500, and 0 otherwise. The HHI 
index is measured as the sum of market share 
squared for firms in the same 3 digit SIC code and 
year, where market share is defined as a ratio of 
sale to the total sum of sales for this market 
Compustat 
Dividend dummy An indicator that takes a value of 1 if a firm pays a 
common dividend in a given year, and 0 otherwise. 
Compustat 
Excess return the difference between a firm’s annual stock return 
in a given year and its benchmark return in the 
same year where the benchmark return comes from 
the Fama-French 25 size and book-to-market 
matched portfolio 
CRSP and Compustat 
Excess cash The residual of the level of cash regression Compustat 
Herfindahl-Hirschman  
index 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) index is 
measured as the sum of the squares of market 
shares of the firms within the same 3-digit SIC 
code industry in a given year, where market share 
is defined as a ratio of a firm’s sales to the sum of 
sales of the industry in a given year. HHI ranges 
from 0 to 1. 
Compustat 
Industry sigma The average of the standard deviation of the ratio 
of cash flow to book value of assets over the last 10 
Compustat 




years of firms in the same 2-digit SIC code 
industries 
Leverage The ratio of the book value of debts, which 
includes short-term and long-term debt, to the book 
value of assets 
Compustat 
Market-to-book The market value of assets divided by the book 
value of assets 
Compustat  
NWC The ratio of net working capital without cash to the 
book value of assets 
Compustat 
Policy uncertainty The natural logarithm of the average monthly BBD 
index in a given year.  
http://www.policyunc
ertainty.com   
PU-fiscal and monetary The natural logarithm of the average monthly fiscal 
and monetary policies component of the BBD 
index in a given year.  
http://www.policyunc
ertainty.com   
PU-news The natural logarithm of the average monthly 
news-based component of the BBD index in a 
given year.  
http://www.policyunc
ertainty.com   
PU-tax code The natural logarithm of the average monthly tax-
related component of the BBD index in a given 
year.  
http://www.policyunc
ertainty.com   
R&D  The ratio of R&D expenses to sales Compustat 
Size The natural logarithm of the book value of assets Compustat 
Size-age (SA) index SA index = −0.737*Assets + 0.043*Assets2 − 
0.040*Age, where Assets is the log of the minimum 
value between actual book value of assets and $4.5 
billion, and Age  is the  minimum value between  
firms’ age and thirty-seven years. 
Compustat 
Whited-Wu (WW) index WW index = –0.091*CF – 0.062*DIVPOS + 
0.021*TLTD – 0.044*LNTA +0.102*ISG –
0.035*SG, where CF is the ratio of cash flow to the 
book value of assets; DIVPOS is a dummy variable 
that equals to one if the firm pays cash dividends in 
a given year, and zero otherwise; TLTD is the ratio 
of the long-term debt to the book value of assets; 
LNTA is the natural log transformation of the book 
value of assets; ISG is the firm’s three-digit SIC 
industry sales growth; and SG is the firm’s sales 
growth. 
Compustat 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable N Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std. Dev. 
Cash /Asset 119,322 0.140 0.022 0.073 0.189 0.176 
Cash /Net asset 119,322 0.302 0.022 0.079 0.233 0.864 
PU 119,322 104.756 81.106 104.041 118.673 26.283 
Book assets ($ million) 119,322 1,012.861 33.653 143.239 728.091 2,063.331 
Market-to-book 119,322 2.243 1.104 1.504 2.361 2.928 
Cash flow 119,322 0.021 0.002 0.101 0.164 0.363 
NWC 119,322 0.064 -0.044 0.057 0.197 0.270 
R&D 119,322 0.083 0.000 0.000 0.069 0.179 
Capex 119,322 0.064 0.019 0.040 0.079 0.073 
Leverage 119,322 0.224 0.019 0.175 0.347 0.248 
Dividend dummy 119,322 0.325 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.469 
Acquisition 119,322 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.060 
Industry sigma 119,322 0.173 0.085 0.138 0.208 0.148 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the full sample. Cash-to-assets is the ratio of cash to 
the book value of assets. Cash-to-net assets is the ratio of cash to net assets, where net assets are 
defined as the book value of assets minus cash. PU is the average of the monthly BBD policy 
uncertainty index in a given year. Market-to-book is defined as the market value of assets divided 
by the book value of assets. Cash flow is calculated as a ratio of earnings after interest, dividends, 
and taxes but before depreciation to the book value of assets. NWC is the ratio working capital 
without cash to the book value of assets. R&D is measured as the ratio of R&D expenses to sales. 
Capex is calculated as the corporate capital expenditure divided by the book value of assets. 
Leverage is the ratio of the book value of debt to the book value of assets. Dividend dummy is an 
indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm pays a common dividend in a given year, and 0 
otherwise. Acquisition is defined as a ratio of corporate acquisition expenditure to the book value 
of assets. Industry sigma is the average of the standard deviation of the ratio of cash flow to the 
book value of assets over the last 10 years for firms in the same 2-digit SIC code industries. 
Appendix A provides the definitions of the variables. 
 
  




Table 2: Policy Uncertainty and Corporate Cash Holdings 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
PU 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.011*** 
 (6.32) (6.27) (4.56) 
Size -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.010*** 
 (12.38) (11.95) (9.53) 
Market-to-book 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 
 (12.78) (12.28) (12.04) 
Cash flow -0.020*** -0.021*** 0.033*** 
 (4.63) (5.03) (7.48) 
NWC -0.110*** -0.102*** -0.064*** 
 (12.96) (11.45) (9.22) 
R&D 0.031*** 0.029*** 0.009*** 
 (18.22) (16.92) (4.38) 
Capex -0.278*** -0.236*** -0.213*** 
 (28.31) (23.15) (20.89) 
Leverage -0.214*** -0.204*** -0.132*** 
 (34.79) (32.37) (20.77) 
Dividend dummy -0.036*** -0.030*** 0.004** 
 (21.83) (18.54) (2.51) 
Acquisition -0.169*** -0.178*** -0.142*** 
 (26.98) (28.04) (24.19) 
Industry sigma 0.135*** 0.081*** 0.028*** 
 (13.00) (9.13) (4.24) 
Intercept 0.135*** 0.155  0.171*** 
 (10.35) (0.01) (12.70) 
Industry fixed effects No Yes No 
Firm fixed effects No No Yes 
Number of observations 119,322  119,322  119,322  
Adjusted R2 0.30  0.32  0.60  
Table 2 reports the results of the cash holdings regressions. The dependent variable is cash-to-
assets ratio. PU is the average of the monthly BBD policy uncertainty index in a given year. Size 
is measured as the natural logarithm of the book value of assets. Market-to-book is defined as the 
market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. Cash flow is calculated as a ratio of 
earnings after interest, dividends, and taxes but before depreciation to the book value of assets. 
NWC is the ratio working capital without cash to the book value of assets. R&D is measured as the 
ratio of R&D expenses to sales. Capex is calculated as capital expenditures divided by the book 
value of assets. Leverage is the ratio of the book value of debt to the book value of assets. Dividend 
dummy is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm pays a common dividend in a given 
year, and 0 otherwise. Acquisition is defined as a ratio of corporate acquisition expenditure to the 
book value of assets. Industry sigma is estimated as the average of the standard deviation of the 




ratio of cash flow to book value of assets over the last 10 years for firms in the same 2-digit SIC 
code industries. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 




Table 3: Policy Uncertainty, Sensitivity to Government Spending, and Firm Cash Holdings 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PU 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.037*** 0.018*** 
 (4.48) (3.59) (12.18) (6.08) 
PU × Sensitivity to government spending dummy 0.008** 0.005*  
 (2.14) (1.68)  
Sensitivity to government spending dummy -0.02 -0.011  
 (1.19) (0.67)  
PU × Government contract dummy 0.002 0.018** 
 (0.26) (2.22) 
Government contract dummy -0.025 -0.080** 
 (0.62) (2.16) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Number of observations 119,322 119,322 58,142 58,142 
Adjusted R2 0.30 0.60 0.33 0.67 
Table 3 reports the results of the cash holdings regressions. The dependent variable is cash-to-
assets ratio. PU is the average of the monthly BBD policy uncertainty index in a given year. Size 
is measured as the natural logarithm of the book value of assets. Sensitivity to government spending 
dummy is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm’s industry sensitivity to government 
spending is above the sample median, and 0 otherwise. Government contract dummy is an indicator 
variable that equals to 1 for firms with sales to the government exceeding $1 million in a given 
year and 0 otherwise. The sensitivity to government spending is measured by the ratio of an 
industry’s sales purchased by the government. The regressions control for other variables as 
specified in equations (1) but their estimates are suppressed for brevity. t-statistics based on 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parentheses. The 


















Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PU 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.006* 
 (8.05) (5.89) (5.73) (1.85) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Number of observations 73,973  45,349  73,973  45,349  
Adjusted R2 0.30  0.25  0.60  0.54 
Test of difference in coefficients 
of PU of two subgroups: 
    
        χ2 1.42    
        p-value 0.23    
Table 4 reports the results of the firm cash holdings regressions for subsamples of firms in 
countercyclical and pro-cyclical industries. Countercyclical (pro-cyclical) industries include those 
that have industry average coefficients of correlation between sales and annual GNP below (above) 
the sample median. The dependent variable is cash-to-assets ratio. PU is the average of the 
monthly BBD policy uncertainty index in a given year. Columns 1 and 2 report the results of OLS 
cash holdings regressions while Column 3 and 4 report the results of cash holdings regressions 
that additionally control for firm fixed effects. The regressions control for other variables as 
specified in equations (1) but their estimates are suppressed for brevity. t-statistics based on 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parentheses. The 
symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Instrumented PU  0.458***  0.195*** 
  (42.83)  (21.20) 
Polarization 0.496*** 0.690***  
 (59.01) (52.95)  
Size -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.026*** -0.013*** 
 (15.79) (27.30) (23.21) (24.41) 
Market-to-book -0.002*** 0.008*** -0.002*** 0.005*** 
 (6.77) (42.03) (7.69) (33.06) 
Cash flow 0.020*** -0.023*** 0.018*** 0.034*** 
 (8.03) (11.84) (5.83) (20.14) 
NWC -0.018*** -0.093*** -0.009** -0.059*** 
 (6.00) (39.36) (2.22) (26.17) 
R&D -0.002*** 0.032*** -0.004*** 0.010*** 
 (2.77) (46.50) (2.92) (14.17) 
Capex -0.154*** -0.171*** -0.291*** -0.139*** 
 (16.51) (22.11) (22.29) (17.12) 
Leverage 0.011*** -0.206*** -0.016*** -0.126*** 
 (3.63) (90.44) (3.76) (52.24) 
Dividend dummy 0.031*** -0.041*** 0.029*** -0.000 
 (19.58) (32.97) (12.04) (0.36) 
Acquisition -0.255*** -0.049*** -0.185*** -0.096*** 
 (22.75) (5.26) (15.38) (13.73) 
Industry sigma -0.122*** 0.170*** -0.223*** 0.066*** 
 (25.35) (44.66) (31.02) (15.18) 
Intercept 4.332*** -1.915*** 4.327*** -0.678*** 
 (738.34) (38.58) (539.50) (15.93) 
Firm fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Number of observations 119,322  119,322  119,322  119,322  
Endogeneity test:     
Wu-Hausman F-statistic 2,763.11*** 1,848.39***  
    
Underidentification test:       
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic 5,000.31***   1,185.06***  
      
Weak identification test:       
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 5,218.94***   1,194.63***  
      
Weak instrument robust inference:       




Table 6 reports the results of the firm cash holdings two-stage IV regressions. The outcome 
variable is cash-to-assets ratio. PU is the average of the monthly BBD policy uncertainty index in 
a given year. Polarization is a measure of political polarization of the U.S. Senate, which is used 
as the instrument for policy uncertainty. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of the book value 
of assets. Market-to-book is defined as the market value of assets divided by the book value of 
assets. Leverage is the ratio of the book value of debt to the book value of assets. Other variables 
are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered 
by firms are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 













Anderson-Rubin Wald χ2 2,847.71 ***   1,840.13***  




Table 7: Policy Uncertainty and Firm Cash Holdings – Controlling for Political Uncertainty 
 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) 
PU 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.011*** 
 (9.39) (9.28) (7.42) 
Political uncertainty 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (3.50) (3.43) (3.48) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No Yes No 
Firm fixed effects No No Yes 
Number of observations 119,322  119,322  119,322  
Adjusted R2 0.30  0.32  0.60  
Table 7 reports the results of the cash holdings regressions. The dependent variable is cash-to-
assets ratio. PU is the average of the monthly BBD policy uncertainty index in a given year. 
Political uncertainty is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for a presidential election year 
during the sample period, and 0 otherwise. The regression models include other control variables 
as specified in equations (1) but their estimates are suppressed for brevity. t-statistics based on 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parentheses. The 
symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.




Table 8: Policy Uncertainty, Industry Rivalry, and Firm Cash Holdings 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
PU 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 
 (4.77) (3.06) (4.07) 
Competitive Industry Dummy -0.046*** -0.080*** -0.016** 
 (2.77) (4.84) (2.10) 
PU × Competitive Industry Dummy 0.016*** 0.022*** 0.004** 
 (4.49) (6.22) (2.14) 
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No Yes No 
Firm fixed effects No No Yes 
Number of observations 119,322 119,322 119,322 
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.32 0.60 
Table 8 reports the results of the cash holdings regressions. The dependent variable is cash-to-
assets ratio. PU is the average of the monthly BBD policy uncertainty index in a given year. 
Competitive Industry Dummy is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 for an industry with 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) value below 1,500, and 0 otherwise. The regression models 
include other control variables as specified in equations (1) but their estimates are suppressed for 
brevity. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firms are 
reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
 




Table 10: Policy Uncertainty and Credit Lines 
  Credit Line Credit Line Credit Line Line Credit Dummy 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PU -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.053*** -0.119*** 
 (14.44) (14.65) (14.00) (2.85) 
Size 0.001 0.001  0.001 0.051*** 
 (0.11) (1.22) (1.37) (3.12) 
Market-to-book -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.002 0.006** 
 (11.78) (11.55) (1.60) (2.12) 
NWC 0.358*** 0.340*** 0.262*** -0.134* 
 (26.86) (22.74) (22.80) (1.82) 
R&D -0.061*** -0.057*** -0.012* 0.019  
 (8.26) (7.99) (1.71) (1.16) 
Capex 0.072** 0.048 0.089*** 0.268* 
 (2.16) (1.47) (2.96) (1.75) 
Leverage 0.279*** 0.273*** 0.111*** 0.110 
 (29.58) (28.24) (11.46) (1.56) 
Dividend dummy 0.071*** 0.069*** 0.007* -0.01 
 (20.84) (20.63) (1.71) (0.26) 
Industry sigma -0.122*** -0.109*** 0.016 -0.368** 
 (7.87) (7.18) (0.81) (2.25) 
Cash flow volatility -0.094*** -0.096*** -0.014 0.087 
 (9.50) (7.92) (1.24) (0.76) 
Tangibility 0.234*** 0.278*** 0.528*** 0.104  
 (24.92) (27.28) (28.11) (0.92) 
Profitability 0.032 0.029 -0.039*** 0.080  
 (1.51) (1.40) (3.35) (1.29) 
Intercept 0.831*** 0.804*** 0.673*** 0.977*** 
 (33.74) (32.63) (34.20) (5.17) 
Industry fixed effects No Yes No No 
Firm fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Number of observations 32996  32996 32996 1657  
Adjusted R2 0.20  0.23  0.65  0.69  
Table 10 reports the results of the credit line regressions. The dependent variable in Columns 1-3 
is credit line, which is calculated as the ratio of undrawn revolving credit to the sum of cash and 
undrawn revolving credit. Undrawn revolving credit data are obtained from the Capital IQ 
database. The dependent variable in Column 4 is the Line Credit Dummy, which is an indicator 
variable that equals to 1 for firms with positive lines of credit in the random sample of 300 
Compustat firms constructed by Sufi (2009), and 0 otherwise. PU is the average of the monthly 
BBD policy uncertainty index in a given year. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. t-
statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firms are reported in 




parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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